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Abstract
The article argues that theories of
economic development are metaphors
which have a strong mythical content,
albeit unacknowledged by social scientists.
The policies derived from such theories
have two agendas: a “positive” agenda that
states which problems should be tackled
and how; and a “negative” agenda that
contains issues and policies to be avoided.
This approach is used to interpret the
hegemonic view of development, as stated
by the Washington Consensus, showing
that such view contains all ingredients of a
millenary myth – the crossing of the Desert
towards a Promised Land. The two agendas
of this view of development, which have
ruled the Brazilian development strategy of
the second half of the nineties, are then
analyzed as applied to the Brazilian case.
Finally, the article discusses alternative
approaches to the present view of
development, arguing for open-ended
metaphors, as expressed by the Ulysses
myth.
Resumo
O artigo argumenta que as teorias de desenvolvimen-
toeconômicosãometáforasquetêmumforteconteúdo
mítico, embora este não seja normalmente reconheci-
do. As políticas que derivam destas teorias têm duas
agendas:umaagenda“positiva”,queespecificaquais
p r o b l e m a ss ã or e l e v a n t e sea sf o r m a sa c e i t á v e i sd er e -
solvê-los; e uma agenda “negativa”, que contém as
questões e políticas que devem ser evitadas. Esta
abordagem é usada para interpretar a visão hegemô-
nica do desenvolvimento, tal como explicitada no
Consenso de Washington, mostrando que esta visão
c o n t é mt o d o so si n g r e d i e n t e sd eu mm i t om i l e n a r i s t a
–odatravessiadoDesertorumoàTerraPrometida.
Analisa-se a seguir a aplicação das duas agendas
desta visão de desenvolvimento ao caso brasileiro du-
ranteasegundametadedosanosnoventa.Finalmen-
te, o artigo discute visões alternativas de desenvolvi-
mento, argumentando a favor de metáforas abertas,
como o mito de Ulisses.Comme la tête tranchée d´Orphée, la mythologie
continue à chanter, même aprés l’heure de sa mort,
même à travers l’éloignement.1
1_ Introduction
Over the past years, watching the
Brazilian policy-makers stick to their
course in spite of all warnings about the
high risks entailed by the strategy they
were following, I was often reminded of
Polonius’ remark about Hamlet: “if
this madness be, there is method in it”.
This essay is about the “method” – their
view of development. The strategy is a
consequence of such a view. Quite
obviously, the view of development
provides only a partial explanation of
the strategy; other important factors,
such as economic and political interests,
play important roles in the definition of
a development strategy. Nonetheless,
such other factors are not discussed
below, except in terms of the roles
economic actors are supposed to play in
the strategy.
Development strategies are
derived from “problem-setting”
metaphors. Such metaphors lead to a
“positive” agenda – problems which
must be tackled – and a “negative”
agenda – issues which must be avoided.
For reasons that are explained at
some length below, I believe the
strategy followed in Brazil – as well as
in most developing countries – has
strong mythical contents which the
article tries to bring to the fore. Such
contents help to explain the “positive”
and “negative” agendas of the strategy,
and thereby why the strategy has failed
to achieve some of its most important
objectives. Moreover, they help to
explain the rigid adherence of
policy-makers to a prescribed path.
Analytically, my hopes are that,
by focusing on that hidden aspect of
development, I am contributing to a
multi-disciplinary debate which may
lead to the creation of “cognitive
metaphors” – metaphors which may
“enable us to see aspects of reality that
the metaphor’s production helps to
constitute” (Black 1993, p. 38).
In the following section, I briefly
describe the conditions of the Brazilian
society at the end of the eighties, which
made it ripe for radical changes but, at
the same time, posed a great uncertainty
about the course to be followed.
Section 3 presents, first, a
digression on problem setting and the
role of myths in dealing with
uncertainty faced at times of deep
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1 As the wrenched off head
of Orpheus, mythology
continues to sing, even after
the hour of its death, even
through distance”. Kerenyi
(1968, p. 15).changes, and then it argues that the
development strategy which was (and
still is) hegemonic in Brazil has the
same structure, the same view of the
process of change and the same
approach to history as the myth of
“crossing the desert”. As a myth, it
claims to be the result of a “universal
convergence” of scientists and it holds
a very restricted view of the “world”
that has to be changed, which is limited
to the institutional structure. It has its
doctrine and initiates. In short, it is a
closed-end metaphor.
Section 4 presents the “positive”
agenda of the Brazilian policy-makers –
its scope (institutional reform), actors
and the three virtuous circles which
were envisaged to produce growth. The
evidence presented argues that although
some of the envisaged results did come
true, the virtuous circles turned into
vicious circles.
Section 5 is an analysis of silence
– the issues policy-makers refused to
confront (their “negative” agenda) and
of some implications of such agenda.
The poor record of the strategy can be
also ascribed to the “negative” agenda –
especially its denials of the role played
by the productive structure in the
process of development and the role
played by the state in changing the
productive structure.
In the last section, I briefly
review the debate about the reversibility
of the reforms, but its gist lies in the
argument that, contrary to what is
currently stated, there are alternative
views of development, such as the
evolutionary approach, which sees
development arising from the
coevolution of productive and
institutional structures. Such approach
embodies uncertainty and history but,
most importantly, it stresses theoretical
humility, flexibility, and innovation.
Therefore, it requires open-ended
metaphors, which are not provided by
cosmological myths such as the myth of
crossing the desert.
2_ A time of darkness
At the end of the eighties, Brazil was
ripe for important changes. The long
process of restoring democracy was
ending: a new constitution was voted in
1988 and the first direct election for
president since 1960 was scheduled for
the end of 1989. But, defeating many
hopes, democracy did not bring along
economic prosperity. Quite the
contrary, the economy was plagued by
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been carried from “high and chronic”
levels to the brink of hyperinflation, where
indexing mechanisms played perverse
roles. The short and sharp cycles of
economic activity during the eighties –
coupled with the incapacity of the
governments (authoritarian and
democratic) to kill the “dragon of
inflation”2 and to negotiate the external
debt – led to a deep disillusionment with
the pattern of development which
prevailed since the thirties, in which the
state played a leading role (Castro, 1993).
The debacle of the Plano Cruzado
at the end of 1986 (a “Plan which must
succeed” and which promised an easy
way out of inflation and the quick
resumption of growth) was probably a
watershed in the perception of agents
about the possibilities of development
of Brazil. It was no longer possible to
sustain the idea that development was
Brazil’s manifest destiny3 and the
“convention of growth” which had
ruled the country through military and
democratic regimes (Castro, 1993) came
asunder. It is significant that, in the
1989 election, there were no leading
candidates upholding the previous
pattern of development – and much
less so the outgoing government.
International conditions favored
drastic changes, too. The criticism of
the import-substitution
industrialization, which had mounted
during the seventies (e. g. Krueger,
1974), coalesced with the reform wave
of the Thatcher/Reagan period and
became a blueprint for stabilization and
growth of developing countries – the
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson,
1990), to which we return in the next
section. Such recommendations came at
a time in which the capitalist world
economy showed increased vigor in
terms of trade, investment, and
technological development, increasing
the legitimacy of such
recommendations.
3 _W h e r ed ow eg ot o ?
To cross the desert
The electoral campaign of 1989 showed
that there was a consensus that deep
changes were necessary in Brazil, but it
also showed that the options presented
by the two leading contestants were far
from clear (Conti, 1999). Uncertainty
was the hallmark of the period.
Economists of Keynesian and
evolutionary persuasions have long
argued that uncertainty is not
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2 Depicting inflation as a
d r a g o nw a sw i d e l yu s e db yt h e
media. The most popular saint
in Brazil is St. George, the
dragon-slayer.
3 In the four decades
following 1940, the GDP
average yearly growth rates
were: 5.9% (1940/50); 7.4%
(1950/60); 6.2% (1960/70);
8.6% (1970/80). Such high
growth rates were
spearheaded by industry,
which grew by 9.0%; 9.1%;
6.9%, and 9.0% in the same
periods. The secular growth
rates (1900/80) were 5.7%
and 7.1%, respectively (Bonelli
and Gonçalves, 1998).synonymous with incomplete
information, that economic agents
breach the gulf of substantive
uncertainty by recourse to institutions,
conventions, and emotions, such as
Keynes’s “animal spirits” and
Schumpeter’s “entrepreneurship”.
Part of the conventions which help
social actors to deal with uncertainty are
“stories” told about change – of how
change is necessary and, especially
feasible, even under difficult
circumstances. In fact, in his analysis of
metaphors, Johnson (1987) argued that
moving from one point to the other along
a“ path” is one of the basic image
schemata we use. Coupled to the “scale”
schemata which organizes our experience
of “more”a n d“ different”( ibid), the “path”
schemata provides a basic experience of
development. But to serve as guidelines
for action in complex situations, such a
schemata must be organized and enriched
by more complex metaphors.
As pointed out by Schön (1993),
we think about social problems “in terms
of certain pervasive, tacit generative metaphors”
(p. 139, emphasis added), which are used
for problem-setting, “to describe what is
wrong with the present situation in such a
way as to set the direction for its future
transformation” (p. 147).
Some of such tacit and pervasive
metaphors are provided by myths. The
function of the myth is to reveal models,
reducing uncertainty (Eliade, 1963).
“Myths guarantee to Man that what he is
preparing to do was previously done, they
help him to chase the doubts he could
hold about the result of his
enterprise”(Ibid, p. 173, his emphasis, my
translation). Although they may have
lost their sacred meaning, some myths
are metaphors which are widely shared
in a society – they provide “stories”
about change that everybody knows.
Consider, for instance, the
millenialist myth we all know. A People
is immersed in sin and it is leading a
m i s e r a b l el i f eu n d e rt h er u l eo ft h e
Daemon. A courageous Leader guided
b yt h eD o c t r i n eg i v e nb yaD e i t yc o m e s ,
and with the help of a devoted band of
early followers, defeats the Daemon and
leads the People to a Promised Land.
However, before reaching this wondrous
place, they must surmount many
obstacles. Some of the obstacles are
external (e. g. a desert), others are internal
(doubts). Doubters must be convinced
to continue by the combination of
menaces and promises. Many of the
persons who started the journey will not
end it: either because of weakness or
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became allies of the Daemon. The latter
must be eliminated ruthlessly. Faith and
Perseverance are essential. Finally, the
People reach the Promised Land.
History – and the story – end here.
A characteristic of myths is that
they have many variations.4 Readers of
a Judeo-Christian culture will probably
have recognized the story as that
presented in the Exodus chapter of the
Bible. However, Romans acquainted
with Virgil could have recognized in
the story several elements of the
Aeneid. More modern versions of this
myth can be found in some
Marxist-Leninist visions of history: Try
replacing the People by the Proletariat,
t h eL e a d e rb yt h eP a r t y ,t h eD a e m o n
by Capitalists and the Promised Land
by Communism. As for individuals, all
initiation rites (from those performed
in Amerindian cultures to those
necessary to be admitted to academic
or esoteric communities) share some
of the structural features of this myth
(Johnson’s schemata): the path from a
“bad” to a “good” situation is fraught
with sacrifices and helped by a
superior force.
Am y t hi sn oo r d i n a r ys t o r y–
ancient people distinguished between
“myths” (true stories) and “fables”
(false stories) (Eliade, 1963). To be a
“true” story, it had to be told by
someone holding special powers, a
priest or a chaman. Nowadays, such
sacred role is performed by scientists. If
a version of the myth is presented
under scientific language the original
sacredness of the myth is restored5 and
its power reinforced.
An integral part of a mythical
thinking is the initiates’ belief that they
hold the Truth. Skeptics, who point
out that the myth may reveal only part
of reality, are not tolerated. At best,
they are misguided and must be
enlightened, but if they persist in their
doubts, this is a clear sign of being
allies of the Daemon.
By the end of the eighties the
Washington Consensus presented all
elements needed for a modern generative
millenialist metaphor. To societies
plagued by slow growth and high
inflation, the Washington Consensus
identified the Daemon, the cause of their
afflictions: the State. The State suffocated
the market through protection,
regulation, public property, fiscal
profligacy and an ever-increasing and
self-serving bureaucracy. Misallocation
of resources, slow productivity growth,
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4 See Calasso (1990) for a
discussion of myths’
variations.
5 On the political uses of
science, see Ezrahy (1971) and
Habermas (1971).consumer’s damnation through high
prices and poor quality products and
services were the results.
T h ep a t ht oan e ws o c i e t yw a s
provided by institutional reform. Such
reform, to be effective, had to be
pervasive.As examined in detail by
Eliade (1963), cosmological myths
hold that the New World cannot come
into being unless the Old World has
been destroyed. For the Washington
Consensus, the “world” is equated to
institutions, reversing the “old”
emphasis on productive structure
posed by ECLA and other
developmentalists. If the latter, by and
large, ignored institutions, the
reformers of the Consensus dealt with
institutions only – the blindness of one
is the vision of the other. Therefore,
not only the “world” must be renewed,
but the whole concept of what is the
“world” is changed.
R e f r a i n i n gt oc a l ls u c hs w e e p i n g
reforms a “revolution” is probably a
result of the socialist overtone the latter
concept acquired. Nonetheless, the
term adopted, “structural reforms”, has
a deep resonance in Latin America,
where during the sixties it was a rallying
cry for change and development. It is
true that, in the past, “structural
reform” was a banner of the left, and
now it had changed hands, but such
rhetorical appropriations are not
uncommon.
Although the sequencing of the
reforms admitted variations, at the end
of the path would lie a society ruled by
efficiency and merit. As all national
societies followed the prescribed path
and became market-driven and
democratic, history would come to an
end. If duly propitiated, foreign capital
and international institutions would be
the presiding angels which would help
underdeveloped societies to reach the
desired goal, bringing guidance and
manna – finance and technology.
Several rhetorical elements
reinforced the story told by the
Consensus. First, its claim to
scientism. As it is well known, the
Consensus is based on a theoretical
tripod: conventional neo-classical
economics, public choice theory, and
the new institutional economics. The
latter two may be viewed as resulting
from the “invasion” of political
science and sociology by neo-classical
economics assumptions such as
methodological individualism.
Reviewing the Consensus at the
beginning of the nineties, its godfather
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convergence... is drawn from that body
of robust empirical generalizations that
form the core of economics”
(Williamson, 1993, p. 1333). To
conclude, he states “I regard [the
Washington Consensus] as an attempt
to summarize the common core of
wisdom embraced by all serious
economists” (ibid, p. 1334). In other
words, there is one and only one
Doctrine and those who disagree are
apostates (or cranks).
Second, its claim to universality.
As shown by the first quote above, by
the early nineties the Washington
Consensus – thus baptized because it
reflected a list of “economic reforms
that were being urged on Latin
American countries by the
powers-that-be in Washington” (as
explained by Williamson himself – ibid,
p. 1329) – had become a “universal
convergence”.6 The downfall of
socialist regimes, and consequently of
the socialist myth as a competitor to
the Consensus, strengthened this claim
further. The Hegelian view of history
provided by Fukuyama (1989),
whereby countries which combined
political democracy and market-led
economies had completed their
trajectory, reaching a “post-historical”
condition, provided a powerful
metaphor for the claim to universality.
Opposition to “universal trends” is
both illegitimate and inefficient.
Last but not least, doubts about
the persistence and relevance of mythical
rhetoric can perhaps be dispelled by
noting the emphasis of reformists on the
“fundamentals” of the economy7 and
recalling that the Washington Consensus
is presented as a Decalogue (Williamson,
1990 and 1993).
It is true that the magic of the
Consensus was short-lived, at least in
Washington: by the end of the decade
it was disowned by its institutional
parents – its policies were dubbed
“hardly complete and often misleading”
by no less than the Senior
Vice-President and Chief Economist of
the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 1).
Nonetheless, the Consensus
marches on, with variations. Stiglitz
has left the Bank and the latter’s
bureaucracy now speaks of “second
generation” reforms, i. e.t h e
Consensus was correct but incomplete.
Although there are alternative views of
development, such as provided by the
evolutionary research program, which
regards development as resulting from
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6 Witness its application in
Africa, under the name of
“structural adjustment
programs”.
7 Note that “fundamental
Islamism ” is identified by the
western press as equivalent to
bigotry and irrationality.the coevolution of institutional and
productive structures, they have not
reached policy-making echelons.8
Moreover, there is no sign of recanting
in the Brazilian policy-making team.
Ideas sometimes take a long time to
cross the Equator line.
4_ Uses of the myth:
the positive agenda –
virtuous and vicious circles
Few politicians in the Brazilian history
have presented such messianic traits
to the public as Fernando Collor, the
winner of the 1989 election.
Notwithstanding the fact that he had
run a millionaire campaign and been
f a v o r e db yt h em e d i aa n d
bourgeoisie, probably his victory was
also the result that the electorate fell
less insecure with a white, handsome,
educated, rich, and very determinate
candidate than with a former worker –
a testimony to the uncertainty
previously mentioned and to the
importance of the mythical Leader.9
Collor set the country along the
reform path predicated by the
Washington Consensus. Although he
had to resign the Presidency in 1992
following corruption charges, the path
was trod on by his successors –
Collor’s Vice-President, Itamar Franco
and the latter’s Finance Minister,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was
elected in 1994 and reelected in 1998.
It is on the latter’s development
strategy that we concentrate on.
The Consensus, as a truly
generative metaphor, sets a “positive
agenda”, the issues to which policy
should be addressed to, and a
“negative agenda”, the issues which
should be avoided. Such agendas were
wholeheartedly embraced by Cardoso’s
policy-makers. In this section, we
analyze the positive agenda and in the
next section, the negative agenda.
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8 See Nelson (1995) for a
mid-period review of the
rapidly evolving evolutionary
thinking. It is beyond the
scope of this essay to discuss
in any detail such research
program, but I doubt that it
will produce blueprints for
development, since the
specificity of national
trajectories and uncertainty are
basic tenets of the program.
9 The Brazilian Presidency is
truly imperial, since the
President can legislate through
“Provisional Measures”,
which can be renewed. The
“checks and balances”
between legislature and
executive which are typical of
the U.S. system hardly operate
in Brazil.The positive agenda was
ambitious. Its foremost objective was to
defeat the inflation dragon and then to
keep it under control. The stabilization
plan10 was based on fiscal measures to
bring public deficit under control and
on an ingenuous monetary reform,
which first introduced an account
currency to align prices and then
transformed this currency into money
proper. In subsequent stages, inflation
was kept under control by a
combination of foreign exchange and
monetary anchors – an overvalued
exchange rate (superimposed on import
liberalization) and very high interest
rates. Introduced in 1993, when
Cardoso was the Finance Minister, the
successful stabilization led to his
subsequent election (1994) and
reelection (1998) as President,
indicating the degree to which the
population abhorred the dragon.11
Nonetheless, the positive agenda
did not stop at price stabilization. It aimed
also at growth, by laying down “sound
macroeconomic fundamentals” and
establishing three virtuous circles of
higher investment, higher productivity,
and higher growth, described below.
Moreover, at a deeper level, policy-makers
intended to transform what was seen as
an “organic” (corporative) fabric of
relationships into a more individualistic
society – a truly liberal intention.12
In practical terms, this has been
equated to establishing market-friendly
institutions, following the Consensus
Decalogue – e. g. by privatizing
state-owned enterprises and setting up
sectoral regulatory agencies; eliminating
differences between local and
foreign-owned enterprises; eliminating
price controls by the state and establishing
a regulatory system to avoid market
power misuse; liberalizing foreign trade
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_12 (1)_11-37_janeiro-junho de 2002
The Brazilian development in the nineties 20
10 See Franco (1995) for an
account of the inception of
the Plano Real (Real Plan) by
one of its leading economists
and Castro (1999) for a more
detached analysis, covering
subsequent stages.
11 Collor had promised to kill
the “inflation tiger” with a
single shot. The failure of his
stabilization plan, which
involved the drastic
confiscation of private savings
to reduce liquidity, was
consequential in the decline of
his popularity as well as in the
increase of reaction against
state intervention.
12 The rhetorical expression of
this was “to get rid of Vargas’
heritage”, Vargas being the
President who ruled Brazil from
1930 to 1945 (mainly as a
dictator) and from 1950 to 1954
(as an elected President).
During his first tenure, a
corporative structure was
established, parts of which still
exist (e. g.t r a d eu n i o n
organization and labor
legislation) and heavy industry
was started by a state-owned
enterprise. Petrobras, the state
oil monopoly was established
during his second tenure. In the
present context, he symbolizes
the evils of the old pattern of
development, especially state
intervention in the market.and investment; establishing a new
legislation for intellectual property which
strengthens the rights of innovators;13
liberalizing labor legislation and fostering
regional integration under the
MERCOSUR.
Three entwined virtuous circles
would arise from such reforms, leading
to higher investment and growth.14 The
first and most important circle was
related to globalization (defined as trade
and investment growth above
production growth and elimination of
distinctions between foreign and national
capitals). Trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) would introduce
competitive pressure into the erstwhile
protected markets and bring in more
modern machinery and inputs, increasing
productivity. Trade and FDI are closely
related: FDI requires freedom to import
b u ti th a s ,a tt h es a m et i m e ,ag r e a t e r
propensity to export. In the long run,
such investment would lead to increases
in productivity and hence to greater
exports. It did not matter that a
considerable part of FDI was directed to
purchasing local (private and
state-owned) firms, since this was a
prelude to increases in productivity and
greater exports. Therefore, the large
deficit in the transactions account of the
balance of payments was a temporary
phenomenon as was the reliance on
short-term international finance to fill in
the foreign exchange gap. By the same
token, the very high interest rates
required to attract financial capital would
be short-lived. Moreover, financial
liberalization would allow firms to access
cheaper international sources, reducing
the impact of the high internal interest
rates. The first virtuous circle and, in
fact, the whole strategy were predicated
upon the availability of cheap, long-term
foreign finance.
The second circle was related to
stability: the end of inflation had brought
about a positive income redistribution,
favoring those which had suffered most
under the dragon’s flames and thus
increasing the internal market. At the
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13 About 85% of patents are
held by foreign enterprises
(Erber, 1999).
14 See Franco (1998) and
Mendonça de Barros and
Goldenstein (1997). At the
time the papers were written
and widely circulated (1995),
Franco was the President of
the Central Bank, Mendonça
de Barros was the Secretary of
Economic Policy at the
Finance Ministry and
Goldenstein was an advisor to
the President of the National
Bank of Development, the
leading development agency in
the country. Those papers
may be interpreted as the
“semiofficial” government
view. The press reported that
the President was enthused by
Franco’s paper. There is no
official document stating the
government strategy.same time, stability allowed for longer
time frame, so that the entrepreneurs
would be stimulated to invest and
consumers to buy, fuelling the market.
Trade liberalization would further
stability by acting as a brake on price
domestic producers. Privatization and
deregulation would coalesce with imports
and FDI to increase competition. Wider
markets, positive expectations, and greater
competition would lead to new
investment and trade liberalization would
allow imports of new vintages of
machinery and inputs and therefore to
increased productivity, exports and
growth. Fiscal reform would support a
decline in interest rates and more
“flexible” labor legislation would reduce
costs and increase international
competitiveness. The adoption of an
over-valued exchange rate strengthened
the mechanisms of the two circles, linking
further the stabilization and growth
components of the strategy.
Finally, ancillary to the two
previously described circles, regional
integration would increase trade and
FDI and, at the same time, widen the
national market.
From such virtuous circles,
different roles for social actors are
derived – as in Orwell’s farm, some are
more equal than others and the former
lead the process. In the virtuous circles,
the state – shorn of its enterprises and
committed to fiscal equilibrium – moves
to the backstage and foreign enterprises
– acting as investors, traders, and
financiers – play the leading roles. To
such demiurges of development, all
propitiatory incentives were given: from
changing the Constitution to nominally
equalize them with national enterprises
to fiscal and credit incentives in order to
attract them. National enterprises play
the supporting roles – as one would
expect from reading President Cardoso’s
(1964, 1971) academic works.15 Difficult
roles, it should be said, given the import
liberalization, the overvalued exchange
rate, and the very high internal interest
rates, especially for those enterprises
which had limited access to the
international market. To the many who
failed to cross the desert, social
Darwinism was the answer.
Faith and Perseverance were not
lacking among policy-makers: despite the
Mexican, Asian and Russian crises, they
adhered to the prescribed path, with
some detours such as shifting the weight
on foreign actors from financial capital
to direct investment. The most
important change came in early 1999 in
t h ew a k eo faf o r e i g ne x c h a n g ec r i s i s ,
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15 The Brazilian political
folklore includes the anecdote
that Cardoso said that we
should forget what he had
written. He has denied saying
this. Moreover, his policy is
consistent with the poor
opinion he held about local
entrepreneurs.when policy-makers (after using up a
considerable part of foreign exchange
reserves) were obliged to overhaul the
foreign exchange policy16 and adopted
“inflation targeting”, under the “prudent
supervision” of the International
Monetary Fund. Although those are
important tactical changes, the reform
strategy is maintained. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to briefly analyze the
performance of the virtuous circles.17
Some expectations of the virtuous
circles were fulfilled. First, inflation was
kept under control: from a staggering
5,154% yearly rate in June 1994, just
before the launching of last phase of the
Real Plan, it declined to 1.7% in 1998.
Although the drastic overhaul of the
foreign exchange policy in the beginning
of 1999 pushed the inflation rate up to
9%, this was much less than all analysts
(including the government’s) had
expected. Second, FDI did come in: from
US$ 2 billion in 1994, it grew to about
US$ 30 billion in 1999/2000. Third,
productivity also increased – labor
productivity in industry increased by close
to 6% per year between 1991 and 1998.18
Fourth, with the end of inflation, urban
labor real average earnings19 increased by
8.7% between 1994 and 1995, leading to a
consumer expenditure boom.
Nonetheless, virtue was not duly
rewarded. Gross Domestic Product
growth rates changed from fair in 1994
(5.9%) to modest in 1995 (4.2%),
mediocre in 1996 and 1997 (2.8% and
3.7%), and finally to nil (or close to) in
1998 and 1999 (0.8%). Investment
measured at current prices was low in
1994 (20.8% of GDP) and declined to
19.1% in 1998. Unemployment rose to
unprecedented levels,20 and informal
employment now accounts for more
than half of the total – features which
partly explain increased productivity.
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16 The original foreign
exchange policy operated
under a “band” regime. In
1999, the policy moved to a
floating regime (Pinheiro et al.,
1999) and the real was
devalued about 60%.
17 It is beyond the scope of
this essay to review the
evolution of economic
policies during the Cardoso
Administration. For a
government-sympathetic
account, see Pinheiro et al.
(1999). Unless otherwise
stated, the data presented
below come from their article.
Their series stop at 1998. In
1999, most indicators decline.
18 Sabóia and Carvalho
(1997) and Katz(1999) argue,
first, that the causal
relationship between reforms
and productivity increase is
not established and, second,
that productivity was already
increasing before the reform
period.
19 I thank Lauro Campos of
IPEA for making available the
labor earnings statistics.
20 Open unemployment as
measured by IBGE (the
Brazilian census bureau) in the
main metropolitan areas was
7.6% in 1998, but it should be
stressed that the concept of
unemployment adopted by the
IBGE is very restrictive.
Other sources estimate that
open and disguised
unemployment in São Paulo is
more than double.Labor earnings continued to grow up to
1997, albeit at a slower pace, but then
declined in 1998 and 1999, when they
stood at the same level as that of 1995.
The combination of unemployment,
reduced earnings, and tight and
expensive credit led to a drop of
consumer expenditures.21
Such poor performance can be
ascribed to another circle – of vicious
nature. The envisaged virtuous circles
engendered a perverse progeny: vicious
circles in which the stabilization
anchors (over-valued exchange rate and
high interest rates) led, on the one
hand, to growing deficits in current
transactions, increasing foreign capital
requirements, and thus preventing any
decline in interest rates. On the other
hand, the latter led to low investment
and unemployment as well as to
growing fiscal deficits, which sustain
high interest rates. In other words, the
development strategy faces two
entwined constraints: foreign exchange
and fiscal restrictions.
It is worth showing a few
figures to illustrate such constraints.
Exports grew by 17% between 1994
and 1998, but imports soared ahead,
increasing by 77% in the same period.
As a consequence, the current account
deficit was 4.5% of GDP in 1998.22
The high internal interest rates fuelled
a drive to indebtedness abroad and the
ratio of net debt/yearly exports grew
from 3.5 in 1990 to 4.5 in 1999.
Servicing this debt takes a toll – in
1999, payments for interest and
amortization accounted for 71.5% of
exports and were equivalent to more
than double the entry of FDI (Kleber,
2000). In other words, the foreign
front is structurally vulnerable – a
point to which we will return in the
next section.
Pushing interest rates to sky-high
levels to attract foreign finance capital
and keep inflation under control
seriously damaged public accounts too.
Although the government (all spheres)
has managed to maintain a surplus on
the primary account by cutting down
expenses and increasing fiscal revenue
by several ad-hoc measures, payment of
interests has produced burgeoning
deficits, which reached more than 10%
of GDP in 1999.23 By the end of that
year, the net public debt was equivalent
to 48% of GDP (Gazeta Mercantil,
24/1/2000). The poor quality of public
services underlies such figures, which
most deeply hurts the more
underprivileged groups of society. Since
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21 Internal sales of
domestically produced cars
dropped from 1.36 million
units in 1997 to 967 thousand
in 1998 – below the 1994 level.
22 When explaining his
virtuous circles, Franco (1995)
was targeting a deficit of 3%
of GDP.
23 The primary surplus was
3.8% of GDP – an
extraordinary achievement
from the fiscal point of view,
considering the pressures the
Brazilian social conditions put
on the budget of all
governmental spheres.Brazil presents one of the world’s most
unequal income and wealth distribution,
this means that it is the bulk of the
population which bears the brunt.
The turn of the century was
heralded as a new age. In fact, building
upon idle capacity and lower interest rates
– which enabled increases in the sales of
durable consumer goods – and with
foreign reserves bolstered by an IMF
“package” during a period of relative calm
in the international financial markets,
GNP growth rate shot back to 4.2 % in
2000, inflation was kept within the
targeted limits (6%), and open
unemployment was slightly reduced – to
7.1%. As a consequence of the reduction
of interest rates, public deficit was cut
down to 4.5% of GNP. Government
officials, supported by a highly
sympathetic media, boasted that a new
growth cycle had started – the promised
land was on sight.
By the second quarter of 2001,
such optimism was substantially
reduced. The Argentinean crisis led to
another sharp devaluation of the real
and the Central Bank inflected its
previous policies of lowering interest
rates, in order to keep inflation within
its targeted limits. Moreover, the lack of
investment in electric power generation
and transmission, due to an
ill-conceived privatization scheme,
produced a severe rationing of energy.
As a consequence, uncertainty has
increased considerably and investment
plans are being revised downwards. We
are still plodding through the desert.
To conclude this section, let us
consider an important part of the
positive agenda which has remained
largely unfulfilled – the reform of the
state. The government has provided the
economic team with a considerable
degree of “bureaucratic insulation” and
adopted several important measures as
regards state intervention in the
economy, such as the privatization of
state-owned companies and the setting
up of regulatory agencies, as previously
mentioned.
Nonetheless, some of the most
crucial state aspects in Brazil remain
untouched. The Constitution of 1988 had
still wet ink on its pages and fiscal experts
all around the country proclaimed that its
fiscal structure was unmanageable. Since
then, projects of fiscal reform have piled
up in Congress. It was supposed that a
thorough fiscal reform would be one of
the priorities of the government, since
fiscal “soundness” is an acknowledged
“fundamental”. This was not so! In spite
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Congress, which has approved all major
projects of the executive, the latter has
shown no interest in presenting a
coherent fiscal reform and the debate on
the subject recently progressed only under
IMF pressure. Other aspects of the state
reform, such as electoral legislation,24
distribution of power between the
country’s states and even the
administrative reform were also neglected.
It is probable that this important
aspect of the reform’s positive agenda was
curtailed by political realities: to reform
the state in Brazil implies discussing the
regional distribution of power, income
and wealth, built along decades. The
present government was elected by a
coalition which brought together the
President’s party, nominally a
social-democrat party, and a conservative
party which has been in power since
decades, benefiting from all the
advantages laid by the ancien régime.
Although the latter has recently and
vigorously adopted the liberal rhetoric, it
is essentially a practitioner of the realpolitik
with high stakes put on the status quo of
the state. To breach the issues related to
the state reform means opening a
Pandora box or, more simply, a can of
worms.
As evolutionary economists are
fond of saying, “history matters”. After
fifty years of deep involvement in direct
promotion of the country’s
development, it is not easy for the state
to move backstage. As growth
sputtered political pressures to step up,
state intervention mounted.
Throughout the Cardoso period, a
conflict has divided the economic team,
hinged upon the degree of state
intervention which was necessary in
industrial and trade policy (ITP).25
Since all members of the team
are economists and many of them were
previously academics, a substantial part
of the debate was couched in terms of
economic theory.
The establishment and operation
of the virtuous circles was fully
entrusted to market mechanisms
enhanced by the state reform. If ITP
had a role, it would be found in the
eventual failure of such mechanisms.
But the very abundance of market
failures poses a strategic problem: by
which failure should ITP begin. Welfare
theory does not provide an answer to that
question, since there is no ap r i o r iParetian
criterion to distinguish between two
imperfect positions when there are several
market failures and it is impossible to
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24 Inter allia, a vote in
Congress the Brazilian lower
house of Congress for the
northern state of Roraima is
equivalent to 17 votes for the
state of São Paulo.
25 S e eM e n d o n ç ad eB a r r o s
and Goldenstein (1997), and
Franco (1998) for the opposing
views, although the opposition
is muted. Institutionally, the
main locus of defense of ITP
was the National Development
Bank (BNDES), while the
C e n t r a lB a n kl e dt h e
opposition to ITP.remove all failures simultaneously (Nath,
1969). External criteria deriving from
other economic and political
considerations must be introduced to
select priorities, as Lall (1994) argued was
done in Southeast Asia.
Against this, the faction opposing
any ITP has argued that market failures
have to be balanced against failures
introduced by the very action of the state.
Unfortunately, once again, theory and
empirical evidence prevent
straightforward comparisons of cost and
benefits of the two types of failures and
we are driven back to other,
“nonscientific” (i. e. not derived from
neoclassical economics) criteria.
Lacking such criteria, industrial
and trade policy was conducted on an
ad-hoc manner, trying to solve specific
problems afflicting some sectors or
activities, especially exports. Such an
outcome, which may be interpreted as a
partial victory of interventionists (or a
vindication of history), falls short of an
ITP aiming at changing the productive
structure of the country. Such a
shortcoming can be partially ascribed to
t h en e g a t i v ea g e n d as h a r e db ya l l
policy-makers – discussed in the next
section.
5_ Uses of the myth:
the negative agenda – productive
and regional structures
As remarked above, portraying the past as
“evil” or “inefficient” is a common trait of
cosmological myths. Franco, a learned
economic historian, goes to the length of
singling out the “lost” decade of the
eighties, when import substitution was
irrelevant, as the prime example of the
slow productivity growth ascribed to the
import substitution industrialization
(Franco, 1998).
Denial extends to other structural
components of the previous pattern of
development. Thus “autonomy of
decisions” looses any positive normative
sense26 and tends to become a clear sign
of old/evil thinking. As I have argued in
more detail elsewhere (Erber, 1999), this
had deep consequences for activities
which were linked to the autonomy
objective but are also important to the
transformation of the productive
structure, such as scientific and
technological activities. National
enterprises and parts of the state
bureaucracy were the greatest losers of
this normative reversal.
If autonomy has become a bad
word, “picking the winners” is even
w o r s e–s o m e t h i n ga k i nt op r a i s i n gp o r k
Fabio Stefano Erber 27
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_12 (1)_11-37_janeiro-junho de 2002
26 Once again, history matters:
the state-owned oil company
(Petrobras), the most
cherished symbol of
nationalism in Brazil was not
privatized. The government
had to limit itself to abolishing
the company’s monopoly and
allowing the entry of foreign
enterprises.among Moses followers. This has
prevented industrial and trade policy from
evolving from a set of ad-hoc
interventions to a fully fledged ITP, in
which it is recognized that sectors play
different roles as regards economic and
technological development and, therefore,
as regards the international comparative
advantages of the economy. Recognizing
that potato and computer chips are not
equivalent, the least a modern
government of a developing country can
do is to provide a “vision” of a desired
industrial and technological structure to
be discussed with the private sector so as
to orient investments.
No such vision can be found in
Brazil. Given the role played by exports in
the virtuous circles previously described,
this omission is especially striking: since
the eighties trade specialists have warned
that Brazilian exports consisted mainly of
products which tended to exhibit slow
growth rates in the international market.
Among such specialists, we find at least
two above suspicion – Batista and Fritsch
(1993) – who came to hold high posts in
the Finance Ministry during Cardoso’s
tenure – an indication that it is not lack of
information coming from trustworthy
sources which presides the silence around
the productive structure.
Although Brazil is a “global
trader”, in the sense that it exports to
many countries, and close to 60% of its
exports are manufactured products,27
such products tend to be low-tech
products, either resource – or
scale-intensive commodities which grow
slowly and are subject to cycles on which
Brazil has no control (see Tables 1 and
2).28 Those were the sectors established
during the second half of the seventies,
under the last stage of import substitution
(II PND).29 High-tech, science-intensive
products, which are the fast-growth
sectors in the international market,30
account only for 11 and 7% of
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27 Semi-manufactured
products account for circa 15%
of exports and primary
products for the rest. Such
structure has remained stable
throughout the eighties and
nineties (see Averburg, 1999).
28 The tables are based upon
the series developed by
Moreira (1999) for the
evolution of production value
of manufacturing industry for
the period from1989 to 1998.
The products included
accounted for 89% of
manufacturing industry
production in 1995. To those
products, I have applied
OECD’s classifications of
products according to
technology-intensity and
factor-intensity. The
comments made about the
evolution of the industrial and
regional structures are not
meant to be a full structural
analysis – they are
“problem-setting”.
29 Second National
Development Plan 1974-79.
30 From 1980 to 1997, global
export growth averaged 7.2%
per year. High-tech products
grew by 11.6% and
resource-based products by
only 5.9% (Lall, 1999).manufactured exports, respectively. More
than a third (36%) of the high-tech and
two thirds of the science-intensive exports
are due to one firm only – Embraer,
which produces airplanes. It is somewhat
ironic that this success is to a large extent
due to the heavy state investments the
made in the enterprise during the import
substitution, autonomy-seeking period,
when the enterprise was state-owned.31
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Table 1_ Structure of the Brazilian industrial production (Y); exports (X) and imports (M)
according to technology level of products as a percentage of total value – 1989 and 1998
Technology
level
1989 1999
YXMYXM
Low 58 61 31 58 54 26
Medium 31 29 45 31 35 50
High 11 10 24 11 11 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Moreira (1999), elaborated by the author (see text).
Table 2_ Structure of the Brazilian industrial production (Y); exports (X) and imports (M)
according to factor intensity of products as a percentage of total value – 1989 and 1998
Factor 1989 1998
YXMYXM
Resource-intensive 27 28 21 38 31 17
Labor-intensive 18 13 5 12 10 6
Scale-intensive 34 36 30 32 32 30
Science-based 65 1 667 1 8
Specialized-supplier 15 18 28 12 20 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Moreira (1999), elaborated by the author (see text).
31Embraer was privatized in
1994 with a golden share that
retained government influence
over some strategic decisions.
Privatization certainly helped
the firm to become more
brisk commercially.G i v e ns u c he x p o r ts t r u c t u r e ,i ti s
not surprising that the Brazilian exports
increased by 4.6% per year during the
period 1994/98, while international trade
grew by 7.6% (Pinheiro et al., 1999) and
that the Brazilian share of total world
manufactured exports fell from 1.37% in
1980, when the projects of the II PND
were coming on line, to 0.94% in 1997
(Lall, 1999). In 1999, the favorable export
prospects, given by a sharp devaluation
combined with a sluggish internal market,
did not materialize: the quantum of
manufactured exports remained stable and
their value decreased by 7% (FUNCEX,
2000). Only in 2000, manufactured exports
showed a better performance, surpassing
the 1998 level by 10%, suggesting that it
requires more than macroeconomic
policies to fuel exports.
In contrast, imports are made
up of medium and high-tech products,
which increased their share of total
manufactured imports along time (see
Table 2), pointing to a structural trade
balance deficit. In fact, over the period
1994/98, imports increased by 77%, as
compared with an export growth of
17% only (Pinheiro et al., 1999). In the
latter year, the trade deficit of
electronics products accounted for
88% of the total trade deficit (ibid and
Melo and Gutierrez, 1999). As
expected, the 1999 devaluation led to a
decline in non-oil imports, which was
partly offset in 2000, as a result of
imports of intermediary goods for the
higher output level. As a consequence,
the manufactures trade balance
remained negative.
Foreign trade reflects the country’s
productive structure and, as can be seen
in Tables 1 and 2, the technological
structure of industry has remained stable,
with prevailing low-tech products.
Comparing 1989 with 1998, there is a
noticeable growth in the share of
resource-intensive products, mostly at the
expense of labor-intensive products and
of specialized suppliers. The latter’s
decline can be ascribed to imports of
capital goods, which now account for
more than 50% of the apparent
consumption of such products.
It is true that important
microeconomic changes underlie the
relative structural stability – witness the
impressive productivity increase in
manufacturing industry previously
mentioned, but those are
infra-structural changes which do not
alter the country’s international
insertion. With the present productive
and trade structure, the Brazilian
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resumption of growth leads to a more
than proportional increase in imports,
not accompanied in the same measure
by exports. The ensuing deficit in the
foreign current account must be closed
by foreign capitals.
It is perhaps ironic that the trap
above described, which results from the
different elasticities of imports and
exports, in fact, is an up-dating (applied
to manufactures, which provide the
bulk of the Brazilian foreign trade) of
the well-known diagnostic of the
foreign exchange constraint posed by
Prebisch in 1949 (CEPAL, 1949), which
laid the ground for justifying
import-substitution industrialization in
Latin America.
As shown above, the foreign
indebtedness of Brazil has increased the
vulnerability of the economy. Reliance
on financial capitals to cover a growing
current account deficit would further
increase the vulnerability, requiring high
interest rates to cover the risks and thus
reducing investments. Moreover, as the
recent experience has shown,
international finance capital cannot be
relied upon to support long-term
development prospects. Therefore, FDI
should sustain the main role. The main
motives of recent FDI inflows have
been the Brazilian market (enlarged by
the other MERCOSUR countries) and
the acquisition of local enterprises
(Laplane and Sarti, 1997).32 But, in the
long run, the growth of such market as
well as the growth of exports are
limited by the existing productive
structure, reducing the prospects of a
robust growth of FDI and giving rise to
another vicious circle. The same
constraints apply to national firms too,
since the latter are more tightly bound
to the local market than the
transnational companies.
In other words, we argue that
attention should be paid to the
productive structure of the economy.
Given the well-known problems of
coordination and time horizon entailed
in structural change,33 to hope that the
market by itself will bring about the
necessary changes requires a great
amount of faith. Such attention could
be paid even within the present
development strategy, if policy-makers
w e r eab i tm o r es k e p t i ca b o u tt h e
power of the market. The silence
imposed by the negative agenda on the
change of the productive structure is
deafening.
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32 In 1999, acquisition of
state-owned enterprises
accounted for 30% of total
FDI. Privatization is a
once-for-all phenomenon and
it is coming to an end.
33 For a source above
suspicion, see World Bank
(1993).Moreover, even for sectors for
which there were ITPs, no vision of
structure is to be found. This is best
exemplified by the automotive sector,
where soaring imports and competition
with Argentina for FDI led the
Brazilian government to set up a
complex scheme of incentives, in which
restrictions on imports of final products
were combined with incentives to
import parts and components and fiscal
incentives to investment. Nobody
knows whether authorities government
officials considered one, two or twenty
new assemblers desirable.
Finally, the silence imposed by
t h en e g a t i v ea g e n d ae x t e n d st ot h e
regional structure. Brazil is a continental
country plagued with striking regional
differences, which have not improved
during the nineties, as shown in Table
3. Although a substantial part of the
public deficit is due to the regional
governments (states and municipalities)
the federal government, nominally
committed to reduce public deficit (one
of the “fundamentals”) and
constitutionally bound to oversee the
Union, has turned a blind eye on the
savage competition between the
regional levels to attract investments.
The “fiscal war” certainly benefits the
enterprises which use the incentives,
but the benefits accruing to the
communities are more doubtful,
especially if one takes into account the
intergenerational conflict underlying the
future reduction of fiscal revenue.
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Table 3_ Brazil: regional structure of the gross domestic product – in percentage – 1991 and 1998
Region 1991 1998
North 4.8 4.8
Northeast 12.7 12.6
Southeast 59.1 59.6
Center-West 7.0 7.1
South 16.4 15.9
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Silva and Medina (1999).In order to address the
problems of regional development, a
structural view of the spatial
distribution of economic sectors is
required. It is unlikely that market
forces by themselves will lead to a
more equitable distribution and the
government, prodded by the political
forces asking for more growth,
commissioned a study of investment
prospects along regional axes of
development. Only a small share of
investments would be funded by
public resources, the rest depending
upon private funds. The former have
been included in the budget law, but
it is worth recalling that the federal
budget approved by the Congress is
not mandatory – the Finance Ministry
is at liberty to disburse the funds or
not, according to its assessment of
the fiscal conditions and, in the past,
many projects remained at the
planning board for such reasons. As
discussed above, the destiny of this
plan depends heavily on the outcome
of the fiscal reform debate and on the
possibility of reducing interest rates.
6_ Conclusions
It is a consensus that for Brazil (as
well as the for the rest of Latin
America) the eighties were a lost
decade from the point of view of
development. As shown by Pinheiro
et al. (1999), except for inflation (and
it is a big exception) the record of the
nineties as regards growth,
employment, and export performance
is worse. For the near future, no
major change of strategy is foreseen,
provided no major bad news emerge
from the foreign front.34 As indicated
above, there are strong reasons to
doubt about the capacity of this
strategy to produce high and sustained
growth rates which would lead to the
reduction of unemployment. To many
observers the government seems to be
doomed to go on plodding through
the desert.
Nonetheless, to consider the
nineties simply as another lost decade
is to miss the importance of the
changes it introduced in the Brazilian
society. Some observers may,
simultaneously, recognize the
importance of the changes and wish to
cancel them. Other observers claim
that the reforms are still incomplete
and, therefore, it is sufficient to trod
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34 But see the reduction of
growth in the more
advanced countries and
continuous emergence of
financial crises in the
“emergent” markets
(Argentina, Turkey, where
next?).on the prescribed path, finishing the
present wave of reforms and then
moving on to the “second generation”
of reforms (e. g. Pinheiro et al., 1999).
I differ from the two
observations. I suggest that the former
observers, placed most often in the
opposition, are falling prey to another
type of myth, cycle myths, in which
time is reversible and a former, better
world (a Golden Age) can be restored
(Eliade, 1963). The “goodness” of the
previous pattern of development is
highly questionable – e. g. the income
distribution it produced. Moreover, a
trait which distinguishes primitive
from modern thinking is the
recognition by the latter of the
irreversibility of time. Thinking about
time and of social processes as
irreversible is one of the cornerstones
of the evolutionary theory. If this is
true, the nineties produced a new
institutional structure in Brazil.
As regards the latter observers, I
argue that the basic assumption of the
reform strategy – that institutional
reform suffices to lead to development
– is wrong and that their overall
Weltanschaaung is reductionist and
misleading.
From an evolutionary
perspective, development comes from
the coevolution of the institutional and
productive structures. As indicated
above, the reform of the productive
structure must be tackled in Brazil.
This will require further institutional
change, since the state must intervene
in the process and new governance
mechanisms must be established (e. g.
for coordination of state agencies and
of such agencies with the private
sector) as well as efficient mechanisms
for financing investments out of
national funds.
The coevolution of institutional
and productive structures is
path-dependent, laden with national
specificity and it continuously poses
new problems so that the past cannot
be abolished and history never comes
to a rest. Contrary to the perspective
held by the institutional reformers,
Heraclitus rules: we never plunge into
the same waters twice and there is no
map for the path.
Complex tasks as those
involving development require
open-ended metaphors to deal with
them. The degree of uncertainty
about development processes should
lead to a substantial degree of
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dialogue for the Doctrine is an
important epistemological step which
leads the development strategy to
emphasize flexibility and learning.
Such features are found in the
evolutionary approach.
If such views are correct
cosmological myths are a trap to be
avoided but Odysseus, the wandering
hero who uses intelligence to cross
uncharted seas,35 provides an
appropriate myth to think about
development.
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35 See Calasso (1990) for an
analysis of the myth of
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